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The Uninsured Motorist: A Look At The
Various Uninsured Motorist Statutes
So long as states continue to determine liability for automobile acci-
dents on the basis of the traditional concept of negligence, the financial
resources of the tort-feasor are all important. Justice is served when
innocent victims of automobile accidents can recover for any losses
sustained through another's negligent operation of a motor vehicle. This
note will show what has been accomplished with respect to this prob-
lem and what further steps can be taken in the area of the uninsured
motorist. In addition, the various statutory plans and the major prob-
lems which have arisen under these relatively new statutory plans will
be reviewed. The problems dealt with include: (1) notice provisions;
(2) rights and duties of insurers to defend suits against uninsured motor-
ists; (3) arbitration provisions; (4) residency problems; (5) disclaimer
of other insurers; and (6) statutory construction and interpretation.
TYPES OF STATUTES
There have been many attempts by various states to afford protection
against the uninsured motorist. Massachusetts, as a prerequisite to
registration, requires proof of a liability insurance policy for each regis-
tered auto.1 Upon registration, the registrant must produce either (1) the
certificate of an insurance company which shows that the registrant has
a motor vehicle liability policy,2 (2) a "motor vehicle liability bond"
which conditions that the obligor shall satisfy all judgments rendered
against him arising out of the use or operation of his motor vehicle,3 or
(3) a deposit of cash, stock, or bonds in the amount of $5,000 as
security for the payment by the registrant of all judgments rendered
against him for injury caused by operation of his motor vehicle.4 Fail-
ure to abide by these requirements will subject the operator of a motor
vehicle to fine or imprisonment.5
Some states such as Ohio have Financial and Safety Responsibility
Laws.6 The Ohio Revised Code defines proof of financial responsibility
as
1. MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 90, §§ 34A, D, H, J (Supp. 1962); ch. 90, §§ 34B, C, E, F, G, I
(1954); ch. 175, § 113A, B, D (Supp. 1962); ch. 175, §§ 113C, E, F, G (1959).
2. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, 34A (Supp. 1962).
3. Ibid.
4. MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 90, § 34D (Supp. 1962).
5. MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 90, § 34J (Supp. 1962).
6. OHIo REV. CODE §§ 4509.01-.99.
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proof of ability to respond in damages for liability, on account of acci-
dents occurring subsequent to the effective date of such proof, arising
out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle ... .
After an individual has been involved in a motor vehicle accident in
Ohio in which judgment has been rendered against him, he thereafter
must establish proof of financial responsibility as a prerequisite to con-
tinued licensing.8 These older statutes, however, fail to provide com-
plete protection against the uninsured motorist, and as a result new
statutes have been enacted to protect the innocent against the hazards
of the financially irresponsible, uninsured motorist. The three basic plans
which attempt to solve the problem are: (1) the "Unsatisfied Claim
and Judgment Fund;" (2) the "Compulsory Uninsured Motorist Endorse-
ment Plan;" and (3) the "Combined Plan." States having an Unsatisfied
Claim and Judgment Fund are New Jersey,' Maryland, ° and North
Dakota." States having Compulsory Uninsured Motorist Endorsement
Plans are New Hampshire, " Florida,"a Virginia," South Carolina, 4 and
California." New York has the Combined Plan. "
Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund
To protect persons who have judgments against uninsured motorists
or who sustain losses caused by unknown motorists, some states have en-
acted statutes creating a fund out of which such uncollectible judgments
can be satisfied." The fund is supported by imposts upon uninsured mo-
tor vehicle owners and insurance companies. 8 New Jersey assesses a spe-
cial registration fee of one dollar which is earmarked for the fund." If
the automobile is uninsured, the fee is three dollars." Any deficiency in
the fund is made up from assessments against insurers doing business in
New Jersey on a pro rata basis equal to the percentage their premium in-
7. OHIo REV. CoDE § 4509.01(K).
8. Ward, The Uninsured Motorist: National and International Protection Presently Avail-
able and Comparative Problems in Substantial Similarity, 9 BUFFALo L. REV. 283 (1960)
[hereinafter cited as Ward, The Uninsured Motorist, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 283 (1960)].
9. NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:6-61 to -104 (1961).
10. MD. ANN. CoDE am 66V,2 § 150-79 (1957).
11. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 39-17-01 to -10 (1960).
12. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 268:15, 412:2-A (Supp. 1961).
12a. FLA. STAT. § 627.0851 (1961).
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (Supp. 1962).
14. S.C. CODE § 46-750.14 (1962).
15. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2.
16. N.Y. INS. LAw §5 600-25, 167(2) (a).
17. 7 AM. JuP. 2D Automobiles and Highway Traffic 5 301 (1963).
18. Robson v. Rodriquez, 26 N.J. 517, 141 A.2d 1 (1958).
19. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-63(b) (1961).
20. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6 -6 3(a) (1961).
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come from such business bears to the total of such business within the
state.
21
Those qualified to collect from the fund in New Jersey include:
(1) residents of New Jersey; (2) owners of motor vehicles registered
in New Jersey; and (3) residents of other states, territories, or districts
of the United States where recourse is afforded to residents of New Jersey
"of substantially similar character" as that provided in New Jersey.2 The
last clause, dealing with reciprocity, has caused much confusion and will
be discussed subsequently. 2' A claimant from the fund must show that
he has made every effort to satisfy his judgment, including attachment of
any property or other assets of the judgment debtor. 4 The fund is not
intended to make every claimant completely whole, but is to provide only
some measure of relief, up to a maximum of $5000.25 Where a claimant
has received compensation for his injuries from other sources, such com-
pensation is deducted from the amount recoverable from the fund.26
The principal arguments against the fund approach are: (a) the state
is selling insurance in competition with private insurers; (b) the burden
of the cost is placed on those already insured through increased pre-
miums; and (c) the irresponsible motorists are purchasing cheap insur-
ance protection. However, in weighing these arguments against the fact
that many victims who heretofore had gone uncompensated are now being
compensated for their injuries, the objections cannot prevail." Since the
uninsured motorists cannot collect from the fund, they are not actually
purchasing insurance cheaply. While it is true that in essence the unin-
sured motorist is obtaining inexpensive liability protection, the real pur-
pose of the fund is to protect the innocent victim.
Compulsory Uninsured Motorist Endorsement Plan
Under the "Compulsory Uninsured Motorist Endorsement Plan,"
every insurer writing automobile liability insurance in a particular state
must include within its coverage an uninsured motorist endorsement.28
The purpose of a statute making uninsured motorist coverage compulsory
is to give the same protection to a person injured by an uninsured motor-
ist as he would have had if he had been injured by an automobile covered
21. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-63(c) (1961).
22. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-62 (1961).
23. See pp. 390-91 infra.
24. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-70 (1961).
25. Wormack v. Howard, 33 N.J. 139, 162 A.2d 846 (1960); Dixon v. Gassert, 26 N.J.
1, 138 A.2d 14 (1958).
26. Dixon v. Gassert, supra note 25.
27. 24 Ga. B.J. 426, 431 (1962).
28. Note, 47 VA. L. REV. 145 (1961).
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by a standard liability policy.29  New Hampshire," Florida,Ia Virginia,"M
South Carolina,32 and California33 have adopted this type of provision.
Only Virginia and South Carolina, however, extend coverage to property
damage as well as personal injuries.
The Virginia statute presents a prime example of this type of plan.
The Virginia General Assembly has placed the financial burden of pro-
tecting victims of uninsured drivers upon the owners of uninsured motor
vehicles by requiring the uninsured motorist to pay an additional registra-
tion fee. The money is in turn distributed to each insurance company
writing uninsured motorist endorsements in Virginia in the proportion
which its premium income for the previous year from the basic uninsured
motorist coverage bears to the total of such premium income from all
such basic coverage written in the state during the previous year. 4 This
distribution to the insurers reduces the insured's premium cost. 5 Even if
a policy is issued without a provision for an uninsured motorist endorse-
ment, the insured still will be afforded uninsured motorist coverage. 6
These policies must cover the "named insured and, while resident of the
same household, the spouse of any such named insured, and relatives of
either. . . ."" The policy contains a second mandatory classification
which provides coverage for any other person who uses the insured's ve-
hicle with the express or implied consent of the named insured and for
any guest in such vehicle.3"
New York's Combined Plan
New York has combined the features of the "Fund Plan" and the
"Uninsured Motorist Endorsement Plan."39 Those who have automobile
liability insurance receive the mandatory uninsured motorist endorsement.
Those who do not have such coverage may proceed against a fund which
protects persons who are injured by uninsured motorists and cannot collect
their judgment. To administer the fund, New York has created the
Motor Vehicle Accident Indemnification Corporation (hereinafter re-
29. 7 AM. JU.L 2D Automobile Insurance § 135 (1963).
30. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 268:15, 412:2-A (Supp. 1961).
30a. FLA. STAT. 5 627.0851 (1961).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (Supp. 1962).
32. S.C. CoDE § 46-750.11 (1962).
33. CAL. INs. CODE § 11580.2.
34. Note, 47 VA. L REv. 145 (1961).
35. Ibid.
36. Chadwick & Poche, California's Uninsured Motorist Statute: Scope and Problems, 13
HAT rNGs LJ. 194 (1961).
37. V& CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(c) (Supp. 1962).
38. Ibid.
39. N.Y. INS. LAw § 600-25, 167(2) (a).
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ferred to as MVAIC), a non-profit corporation.4" Capital is provided
by a charge on those insurers writing automobile liability policies in the
state, all of whom must belong to the corporation. The carriers are en-
titled to have the amount of this charge considered as a rating factor in
the determination of their premium rates; the larger the assessment, the
larger will be their premium charges."
In enacting the combined plan, the New York Legislature felt that a
compulsory insurance statute
fails to accomplish its full purpose of securing to innocent victims of
motor vehicle accidents recompense for the injury and financial loss
inflicted upon them, in that the act makes no provision for the pay-
ment of loss on account of injury to or death of persons who, through
no fault of their own, were involved in motor vehicle accidents caused
by (1) uninsured motor vehicles registered in a state other than New
York, (2) unidentified motor vehicles which leave the scene of the acci-
dent, (3) motor vehicles registered in this state as to which at the time
of the accident there was not in effect a policy of liability insurance,
(4) stolen motor vehicles, (5) motor vehicles operated without the
permission of the owner, (6) insured motor vehicles where the insurer
disclaims liability or denies coverage and (7) unregistered motor ve-
hides. The legislature determines that it is a matter of grave concern
that such innocent victims are not recompensed for the injury and finan-
cial loss inflicted upon them and that the public interest can best be
served by dosing such gaps .... 42
The present statute, in seeking to extend coverage to a maximum
number of persons, provides for two classes of claimants: the "qualified"
person and the "insured. '4 ' The basic distinction between the two is that
"qualified" persons do not own motor vehicle insurance of any kind,
while "insured" persons own either a policy of their own or qualify under
another's "omnibus clause. '44  Different procedures are applicable to
"qualified" persons as opposed to "insured" persons, e.g., an insured is
required to arbitrate his claim, while a qualified person can resort directly
to the courts.45 In most cases, the claimant's cause of action, whether an
insured person or a qualified person, is about the same. Classification,
however, may affect the claimant's ultimate recovery. 6 For example,
40. Ward, The Uninsured Motorist, 9 BUFFALO L. REV. 283 (1960).
41. Ibid. In effect, those who have coverage under the uninsured motorist endorsement
provision are bearing the cost of the plan through increased payments. The higher the charge
against the insurer by MVAIC, the higher will be the insurer's premium charges which will
be borne by those who are insured. There should be assessments against uninsured vehicle
owners as well.
42. N.Y. INs. LAW § 600(2).
43. Duesenberg, Recent Developments in Insurance Law, 1963 INS. L.J. 213, 220.
44. An "omnibus" clause is a provision which includes in the term "insured" not only the
named insured, but any other person using the motor vehicle with the consent, express or im-
plied of the named insured. See VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (a) (Supp. 1962).
45. See McCullough, The Uninsured Motorist, 33 N.Y.S.B.J. 343 (1961).
46. See, e.g., Balletti v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 228 N.Y.S.2d 768 (App. Div.
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while there is no requirement that a claimant under the endorsement be
a resident of New York, a qualified person must be a resident of New
York or a resident of a state which provides recourse of "substantially
similar character" to that of New York 7  If a resident of Ohio had an
accident in New York while riding in an automobile insured in New
York, he could recover under the endorsement. He could not recover if
he was a passenger in an automobile with a minimum liability policy
since Ohio has no similar statutory provision. This circumstance seems
to put those who commute or travel to New York at a distinct disadvan-
tage, and it is a matter which needs re-examining. No valid reason seems
to exist for punishing those travelers to New York whose home states
do not have similar legislation.
The remainder of this article will focus on the case law which has
developed under the various statutes. In presenting this case analysis,
the applicable sections of the statutes will necessarily be covered.
NOTICE PROVISIONS
The courts in interpreting the notice provisions have been faced with
the following questions: When must notice be given to the fund di-
rector? When must notice be given to the insurer? When is notice ex-
cused? When is a delay allowed? What is the effect of failure to give
notice? The problems associated with notice have provided one of the
main sources of uninsured motorist litigation.
New Jersey - The Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund
The New Jersey statute presents a typical notice provision." The
Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Act contains a mandatory provi-
sion making notice to the fund director within a stated time after the ac-
cident a prerequisite to recovery.4" The date of mailing usually prevails
as to whether notice was given within the stated period,"o and if the notice
1962); Zuckerman v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 212 N.Y.S.2d 179 (App. Div. 1961);
Application of Culver, 225 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
47. N.Y. INS. LAW § 601. This is the same provision which can be found in the states
having Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Funds. See note 21 supra.
48. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-65 (1961) provides that "any qualified person ... who suffers
damages resulting from bodily injury or death ... arising out of the ... use of a motor ve-
hicle in this State... and whose damages may be satisfied in whole or in part from the fund,
shall, within 90 days after the accident ... give notice to the board ... of his intention to
make a claim thereon .. .provided, any such qualified person may, in lieu of giving said
notice within said time, make proof to the court ... (a) that he was physically incapable of
giving said notice within said period and that he gave said notice within 90 days after he
became physically capable to do so or in the event he did not become so capable, that a notice
was given on his behalf within a reasonable period, or (b) that he gave notice to the board
within 15 days of receiving notice that an insurer had disclaimed on a policy of insurance ....
49. Szczesny v. Vasquez, 71 N.J. Super. 347, 177 A.2d 47 (App. Div. 1962).
50. Gervolino v. Porter, 75 NJ. Super. 246, 183 A.2d 98 (App. Div. 1962).
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is not received, the burden of proving the date of mailing is on
the claimant.5
There are two exceptions to the normal provisions for giving notice
to the fund director: when the claimant is "physically incapable" of giv-
ing notice within the prescribed time and when a claimant is allowed to
give notice "within a reasonable period." These terms have been diffi-
cult to interpret. 2
The leading case in the fund states is Giacobbe v. Gassert,53 where
the claimant suffered severe physical and mental illness and thus failed
to give timely notice. The fund director contended that the claimant
could have written a letter of notice to the board or could have directed
someone to give notice for him. The court rejected a strict literal inter-
pretation of the phrase "physically incapable," stating:
[N]otice is a process to prevent overreaching and otherwise to secure
efficient administration of the fund; and the provision should be liber-
ally read and applied to serve and not to subvert the substantive policy
of relief in the given circumstances. .... 54
The court further stated that "his incapacity in all likelihood was a fac-
tor contributing to his continued ignorance of the law and the fund
created for relief in such cases.""5
Physical incapacity has been established where
because of the physical injuries and their treatment and preoccupation
with his affliction and fear of evil consequences, the victim of the mis-
hap was not mentally and emotionally adjusted to his responsibility of
giving notice .... 56
It has been held, however, that if the victim of the accident is capable of
understanding the nature and effect of other business transactions, he is
capable of giving timely notice to the fund.57 Furthermore, neither emo-
tional concern for the welfare of a spouse" nor infancy 9 will constitute
"physical incapability" within the meaning of the notice provision.
Virginia - Compulsory Uninsured Motorist Endorsement Plan
There is little case law in the field of the uninsured motorist endorse-
ment plan. Where such coverage exists, some states enforce arbitration
clauses in the insurance contract. This practice prevents disputes from
51. Szczesny v. Vasquez, 71 N.J. Super. 347, 177 A.2d 47 (App. Div. 1962).
52. See statutory provisions set forth in note 48 supra.
53. 29 N.J. 421, 149 A.2d 214 (1959).
54. Id. at 426, 149 A.2d at 217.
55. Id. at 426, 149 A.2d at 216.
56. Id. at 425, 149 A.2d at 216.
57. Russo v. Forrest, 52 N.J. Super. 233, 145 A.2d 339 (App. Div. 1958).
58. Gervolino v. Porter, 75 N.J. Super. 246, 183 A.2d 98 (App. Div. 1962).
59. Trevorrow v. Boyer, 52 N.J. Super. 215, 145 A.2d 154 (L. 1958).
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reaching the courts. In other states, such as Virginia, insurers settle the
vast majority of uninsured motorist claims without going to court.6" Vir-
ginia prohibits arbitration of these claims.6
In Virginia, the insured may sue an unknown owner or operator by
naming the defendant as "John Doe." Service of process is then per-
fected by delivery of the pleadings to the clerk of the court in which the
action is brought and service on the insurer as though such insurer were
a party defendant.62 If the uninsured motorist is known, there is no re-
quirement that notice be given to the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles
as a condition precedent to recovery. Nevertheless, service of process
must be made upon the insurer as a prerequisite to recovery from such
insurer."
There has been little case law regarding notice with respect to unin-
sured motorist endorsement statutes because the problem of reporting to
the fund director does not arise. The only notice that need be given is
to the insurance company which issued the policy. The problem of giv-
ing notice to the insurer to enable it to defend the tort-feasor will be dealt
with in a subsequent section of the article.
New York - The Combined Plan
New York has a notice provision similar to that of New Jersey."
New York courts have held that "within a reasonable time" means notice
that is reasonably possible under all of the circumstances of the particular
case.' Although this definition appears to be more liberal, the burden
of proving that a delay in giving notice was reasonable is upon the in-
sured.6" Difficulty in determining the existence of insurance coverage
is an insufficient basis for delay in filing an application for recovery."
Where, however, the claimant was informed that the tort-feasor had insur-
ance, and subsequent to the time notice had to be given the claimant dis-
covered the information was erroneous, it was held that notice was given
within a reasonable time when he filed soon afterwards. 8 Where arbi-
tration is required, the issue of timely notice is not arbitrable; rather it is
a factual issue which must be determined by the court. 9
60. Note, 47 VA. L REv. 145, 151 (1961).
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(g) (Supp. 1962).
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (e) (Supp. 1962).
63. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(e) (1) (Supp. 1962).
64. N.Y. INs. LAW § 608. Notice is required within 90 days of the accident or "within a
reasonable time" if there is incapacity or another valid reason for delay.
65. See Application of Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 235 N.Y.S.2d 34 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
Kaiser v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 231 N.Y.S.2d 178 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
66. Kaiser v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., supra note 65.
67. Application of Culver, 225 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
68. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Soister, 227 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
69. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Brown, 223 N.Y.S.2d 309 (App. Div. 1961).
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It can readily be seen that there is much confusion in the various jur-
isdictions as to when notice must be given or may be excused, what con-
stitutes "physical incapability," and what is a "reasonable time." Perhaps
the statute should enumerate more clearly the elements which qualify one
for excusable delay in giving notice. It is a heavy burden on the courts
to require the judiciary to interpret these general qualifications. For the
sake of uniformity, the legislatures should attempt to eliminate the vague-
ness which exists in the notice provisions of the various uninsured motor-
ist statutes.
RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF INSURER TO DEFEND SUITS
AGAINST UNINSURED MOTORISTS
Fund States
In New Jersey, investigations of claims against the fund are assigned
to insurers; when notice of an action against an uninsured motorist is re-
ceived, the Board may assign insurers to defend such an action.7 The
insurer which has been assigned may, through counsel, enter an appear-
ance "on behalf of, and in the name of, the defendant."'" The defend-
ant also has the right to employ his own counsel and defend the action.72
The right of the Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund Board to as-
sign the defense of actions against uninsured motorists to insurers was up-
held in Maryland," which has a statute similar to that of New Jersey."4
In Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles,75
the insurers contended that the requirement that they investigate and de-
fend claims upon the fund imposed an unconstitutional burden upon
them. In rejecting the insurer's contentions, the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals stated:
The state could take over the business of automobile liability insurance
completely and exclude private participation, or it could compel private
insurers in that field to insure all motorists assigned to them ...
Since the State lawfully could impose those burdens or exactions on
automobile liability insurers, it properly can make the lighter demands
on them that the Act calls for, as a condition of doing in Maryland
the business in which they are engaged for profit.76
Closely aligned with this problem is the problem of default judg-
ments. New Jersey prohibits payments out of the fund for default judg-
70. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-66(a), (b) (1961).
71. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-67 (1961).
72. Ibid.
73. Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 150
A.2d 421 (1959).
74. MD. CODE ANN. art. 66 , §§ 150-79 (1957).
75. 219 Md. 607, 150 A.2d 421 (1959).
76. Allied Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 621,
150 A.2d 421, 430 (1959).
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ments unless notice is given to the Board prior to the entry of such judg-
ment, allowing the Board an opportunity to take action."7 The policy of
those who administer the fund is to require that the defendant's liability
be established, and the entry of a default judgment will cause the courts
to look closely to determine the true damages sustained.7"
Endorsement Plan
The Virginia statute provides that
any insured intending to rely on the coverage required by paragraph (b)
of this section shall, if any action is instituted against the owner or
operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, serve a copy of the process
upon the insurance company issuing the policy in the manner prescribed
by law as though such insurance company were a party defendant;
such company... shall have the right to file pleadings and take other
action allowable by law in the name of the owner or operator of the in-
sured motor vehicle or in its own name . . ..
There is a problem as to who should control the defense. Both the in-
surer and the uninsured motorist have substantial interests at stake. The
insurer will have to pay any judgment rendered for the insured. The
uninsured motorist will be bound by any judgment against him and will
be liable to the insurer as subrogee of the insured's claim."0 The insured
must obtain service of process on the insurer and, unless waived by the
insurance company the insurer will be bound when he has such service
and refuses to enter the case.81
In Matthews v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2 the insurer was invited to defend
the action but did not do so and did not make the reasons for his inaction
known to the insured. The insurer daimed that it could not enter unless
authorized to do so by the uninsured defendant and consequently should
be absolved of any liability on the policy. The court, however, held that
the liability of the insurer is not dependent upon the fact that the unin-
sured motorist has approached the insurer and requested that the insurer
defend him.8" In upholding the right of an insurance company to inter-
vene in such a suit, the court said:
77. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-74 (1961).
78. See Douglas v. Harris, 35 N.J. 270, 173 A.2d 1 (1961); Myers v. Cave, 55 N.J. Super.
185, 150 A.2d 269 (App. Div. 1959).
79. VA. CODE ANN. 9 38.1-381(e) (1) (Supp. 1962).
80. Note, 47 VA. L. REV. 145, 167 (1961). "It -would seem that the insurer must work
closely with the attorneys for the uninsured motorist. In reality the insurer is no more than
an intervenor in the suit, even though it possesses a statutory right to appear. It cannot be
deprived, by the uninsured, of the right to defend in the name of the uninsured." Ibid.
81. Matthews v. Allstate Ins. Co., 194 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Va. 1961); Creteau v. Phoenix
Assur. Co., 202 Va. 641, 119 S.X.2d 336 (1961).
82. Matthews v. Allstate Ins. Co., supra note 81.
83. Id. at 465.
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It is inconceivable to this Court that an insurance company, desirous of
affording protection required by the terms of the policy, would not be
granted leave . . . to intervene as a party defendant .... 84
The insurance company cannot raise any issues of policy coverage
in the tort action against the uninsured motorist because such a proceed-
ing is an action ex delicto for the injury and not an action ex contractu
on the policy."8 However, if the insurer denies all liability on the policy,
it cannot claim the benefits of the "right to defend" provisions.8 6
The right of an insurer to intervene in a suit against an uninsured
motorist has been upheld in states which do not make the "endorsement"
mandatory by statute.8 7 A Missouri court of appeals stated:
The insured [insurer?] should have the right to dispute the questions
which make it liable on its contract. To say in this case that the action
is premature because the insured has not yet established the legal lia-
bility of the uninsured motorist would in effect convert the "legally
liable" policy to an unsatisfied judgment policy and would promote the
multiplicity of suits. 8
The question of whether entry into the suit by the insurer amounts
to a tacit admission of liability under the insurance contract has not
yet been decided by the courts. Since the statutes authorize service of
process on the insurers and some statutes authorize the assignment of
the defense to the insurers, it is doubtful that their entry into the suit
will be regarded as a tacit admission of liability. A contrary argument,
however, can be reasoned on the basis that an insurance company may
lose its right of defense if it disclaims liability under a policy; there-
fore, its entrance into the suit is a tacit admission of liability. It will
be interesting to see how the courts resolve this problem. It may be
advisable to clarify this point by statute.
The problem of service of process on an insurer doing business in a
itcompulsory endorsement" state may arise when the action is brought
in a foreign state which does not permit an insurance company to be
joined as a party defendant. Perhaps the only way to satisfy the re-
quirement of service would be to have the insurance company named as
a party defendant and let it come in and demur to the action.
84. Id. at 466.
85. Rodgers v. Danko, 204 Va. 140, 129 S.E.2d 828 (1963).
86. Childs v. Allstate Ins. Co., 237 S.C. 455, 117 S.E.2d 867 (1961).
87. State ex rel. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. C. App.
1963).




New York has similar provisions whereby the MVAIC can enter a
suit and defend an uninsured motorist.8" The same principles involved
in the cases cited in the previous sections on the insurer's defense in the
fund states and on the insurer's defense in the "endorsement" states,
apply to the provisions in the New York statute." With respect to
default judgments, the New York statute provides "that no claim shall
be allowed and ordered to be paid by the corporation if the court shall
find... that it is founded upon a judgment which was entered by de-
fault . . . ."" The judgment will be set aside upon application by
MVAIC and it can then proceed in the action."2  The same rules apply
if the judgment was entered with the consent of the defendant. 3 The
obvious reasoning behind these provisions protecting against default
judgments is that neither the insurers nor the fund should be liable un-
less a full opportunity to defend is afforded them.
ARBITRATION
The Virginia 4 and South Carolinae3 statutes expressly prohibit arbi-
tration provisions in an uninsured motorist policy. California, however,
provides that if the insured and insurer do not agree on liability or dam-
ages, the dispute is arbitrable.9 " Questions concerning the interpretation
or applicability of the uninsured motorist endorsement itself do not fall
within the compulsory arbitration clause. 7 Some courts hold that arbitra-
tion clauses are contrary to public policy and unenforceable because they
conflict with the basic right of every individual to have his rights deter-
mined in court."
Most arbitration cases have arisen in New York, which permits arbi-
tration of disputes between an insured and the insurer (MVAIC). Ar-
bitrable issues generally have been limited to whether the insured was
89. See N.Y. INS. LAW 5 609.
90. See McCullough, The Uninsured Motorist, 33 N.Y.S.BJ. 343 (1961).
91. N.Y. INS. LAW § 614.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid.
94. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381 (g) (Supp. 1962). "No such endorsement or provisions
shall contain any provision requiring arbitration of any claim... nor may anything be re-
quired of the insured except the establishment of legal liability, nor shall the insured be re-
stricted or prevented in any manner from employing legal counsel or instituting legal proceed-
ings." Ibid.
95. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.18 (1962).
96. CAL. INS. CODE § 11580.2(e).
97. See Chadwick & Poche, California's Uninsured Motorist Statute: Scope and Problems,
13 HAsTiNGs LJ. 194 (1961).
98. See State ex rel. State Farm Mut Auto Ins. Co. v. Craig, 364 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. Ct. App.
1963); Boughton v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 354 P.2d 1085 (Okla. 1960).
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"legally entitled to recover" and the amount recoverable.99 Some New
York courts, however, have taken the opposite view and have held that
all issues pertaining to the obligation of the insurer to pay are arbitra-
ble. °° In the case of a "qualified" person, there is no provision for
arbitration, and he pursues his remedy immediately in the courts.' 0 '
There has been a great deal of confusion as to which issues are im-
mediately arbitrable and which issues must first be tried in the courts.
It generally is held that the issue of whether the other car was insured
or uninsured is not an arbitrable issue.'0 2 Whether proper notice was
given to the corporation is not an arbitrable issue.'0 3 The issue of whether
the alleged uninsured driver was covered as a member of the insured's
household was held to be a question for the court to decide, not the arbi-
trators.' Whether there was actual physical contact between the in-
sured's car and a hit-and-run driver was a question for the court to deter-
mine as a condition precedent to arbitration.0 5 In an action based upon
an insurer's alleged disclaimer of coverage, the disputed facts of the dis-
claimer must be determined by a court prior to the arbitration of any
claim arising under the policy.0 6 A minor child cannot be required to
arbitrate in New York,' but an action by the father of a minor is subject
to arbitation.'0 8 The narrowness of the arbitration provision is best illus-
trated by the court's opinion in The Matter of McGuiness. °9 The court
stated:
It is manifest that the parties in the instant case have not "broadly"
agreed to arbitrate a dispute "arising out of or in connection with" the
Endorsement but have narrowly agreed to arbitrate two disputes and
two alone, i.e., whether the person making the claim is "legally entitled
99. See McCullough, The U-ninsured Motorist, 33 N.Y.S.B.J. 343 (1961).
100. Ibid. Since MVAIC is responsible for payment to both insured and qualified persons,
this distinction does not seem plausible. It appears that the qualified person has better pro-
cedural facilities at his disposal because his entire claim is adjudicated at once, whereas an
insured may have to go to court to settle certain factual issues and then return to arbitration
to settle his claim.
101. See, e.g., In the Matter of Rosenbaum, 11 N.Y.2d 310, 183 N.E.2d 667, 229 N.Y.S.2d
375 (1962); Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Tucker, 226 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
Application of Travelers Indem. Co., 227 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
102. See, e.g., Application of Zurick Ins. Co., 219 N.Y.S.2d 748 (App. Div. 1961); Motor
Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Velez, 220 N.Y.S.2d 954 (App. Div. 1961).
103. See, e.g., Application of Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 228 N.Y.S.2d 508 (Sup.
Ct. 1962); Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Brown, 223 N.Y.S.2d 309 (App. Div. 1961).
104. Application of Phoenix Assur. Co., 194 N.Y.S.2d 770 (App. Div. 1959).
105. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Comerchero, 227 N.Y.S.2d 285 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
106. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Lucash, 230 N.Y.S.2d 262 (App. Div.
1962); Application of Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 227 N.Y.S.2d 886 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
107. Benfante v. Commercial Ins. Co., 162 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
108. Chernick v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 187 N.Y.S.2d 534 (App. Div. 1959). See
7 APPLaMAN, INSURANcE LAW AND PRAcTIcE § 4331 (Rev. ed. 1962); Annot., 79 A.L.R.
2d 1252 (1961).
109. 225 N.Y.S.2d 361 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
[Vol. 15:386
Uninsured Motorist Statutes
to recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured auto-
mobile" and "the amount of payment which may be owing under this
endorsement." 10
Apparently, an unnecessary duplication of procedure is involved in
arbitrating one's claim. Most of the issues arising under the policy must
be decided judicially. After the court decides the issues, the insured
motorist must return to the arbitration table. Perhaps it would be more
plausible to eliminate arbitration, as did Virginia, and have the court de-
termine the validity of the entire claim and the amount recoverable in
a single hearing. Of course, if the insurer and insured can arrive at a
fair settlement on their own, then this large multitude of litigation can
be reduced.
RESIDENCY PROBLEMS UNDER THE FUND
To qualify under the fund, one must be a resident of the fund state
or a resident of another state in which similar recourse is afforded."'
A New Jersey court in Collins v. Yancey" 2 held that a native of Vir-
ginia who worked in New Jersey for five months prior to being injured
was a "qualified" person within the meaning of the statute. Conversely,
where a claimant, a native of West Virginia, accepted a job in a fund
state but was injured before he started working, he was held not a "quali-
fied" resident under the statute."3  A student spending the summer in
a fund state who left the state to return to college in the fall was not
such a resident as would qualify under the statute." In Rosenfield v. An-
gerstein,"5 the deceased victim was a resident of Pennsylvania when
injured in New Jersey. Her son, a resident of New Jersey, sought re-
covery from the fund under a wrongful death statute. It was held that
the residence of the decedent controls and not that of the survivors. A
New York court in Appleton v. Merchants Mut. Ins. Co.,"' stated:
[W]here the absence from home is a temporary one, the courts have
declined to require that the person seeking coverage dwell under the
same roof at the time of the accident to be a "resident of the house-
hold" or "member of the family" to come within the meaning of some
other similar phrase to effect coverage .... "7M
Hence, it would seem that the courts have construed the term "resident"
to mean "domicile.""'
110. Id. at 364.
111. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6-62 (1961).
112. 55 N.J. Super. 514, 151 A.2d 68 (L 1959).
113. Maddy v. Jones, 230 Md. 172, 186 A.2d 482 (1962).
114. Continos v. Parsekian, 68 N.J. Super. 54, 171 A.2d 663 (App. Div. 1961).
115. 71 N.J. Super. 409, 177 A.2d 38 (App. Div. 1962).
116. 228 N.Y.S.2d 442 (App. Div. 1962).
117. Id. at 446.
118. See BRENzwEIG, CONFLICr OF LAws § 72 (1962).
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The real test of reciprocity "is whether the state from which the non-
resident comes would extend an equal benefit to a non-resident upon
the same facts."' 19 If there is no similar protection in the other state, or
if the other state has a fund statute, but the claimant would be precluded
from recovery in the other state, then he would be precluded in his pres-
ent suit.'
In United States v. /hitcomb,' the United States sought recovery
from Maryland's Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund for damages
to a post office truck by an uninsured motorist. The United States con-
tended that the Federal Tort Claims Act was "substantially similar" to
the fund act. The district court held that the United States is not a
"qualified" person within the meaning of the statute, and that the Federal
Tort Claims Act is not "substantially similar" to the Maryland statute.
DISCLAIMER OF OTHER INSURER
A motorist is uninsured within the meaning of the uninsured mo-
torist statute if the insurer disclaims liability on the policy.'22 The South
Carolina statute has been interpreted to mean that the insurer must
successfully deny coverage before a motorist is deemed uninsured. 3
Until there has been an adjudication that an insurance company has
successfully denied coverage, an insured in South Carolina is not en-
titled to uninsured motorist protection."' The converse appears to be
the result in Virginia, for the statute says nothing of "successful" denial
of coverage on the part of the insurer, but speaks only of denial.'25 In
New York it has been held that the disclaimer need not be a valid
one. 6 The mere fact of disclaimer is enough to constitute the other
car uninsured. The reasoning behind this New York decision was that
whether the disclaimer was valid or not, the innocent victim was pre-
cluded from recovery unless the tort-feasor was deemed uninsured, thus
entitling the injured victim to seek recovery from the fund.
A disclaimer of liability usually arises where there is coverage, but
because of some action on the part of the insured, the company refused
to respond. The legislature, however, never contemplated coverage in
a case where the insurance company involved becomes bankrupt subse-
119. Farina v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 228 N.Y.S.2d 20, 22 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
120. Ibid.
121. 200 F. Supp. 249 (D. Md. 1961).
122. VA. CODE ANN. § 38.1-381(c) (Supp. 1962).
123. Dai & Richardson, The South Carolina Uninsured Motorist Law, 15 S.C.L.Q. 739
(1963).
124. Ibid.
125. VA. CODE. ANN. § 38.1-381(c) (Supp. 1962).
126. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp. v. Morera, 219 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct. 1961);
cf. In the Matter of Bernan, 171 N.Y.S.2d 869 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
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quent to the occurrence of the accident Thus, bankruptcy of the insurer
is not analogous to a disclaimer of the policy which would constitute the
other car uninsured.'
To have a valid disclaimer, there must be a valid existing policy. A
New Jersey court, in Parrot v. Chiselko,2 s held there could not be a
disclaimer of a policy which did not go into effect until two days after
the accident. The court said:
[T]he statutory wording, "that an insurer had disclaimed on a policy
of insurance so as to remove or withdraw liability insurance," (empha-
sis added) imports that if the "disclaimer" were not made, a valid policy
of insurance would subsist. One cannot withdraw or remove a thing
which never existed. 2 9
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION
New York courts seem to impose a strict construction and interpre-
tation on their uninsured motorist statute.' Where there is no statutory
provision for a stay of an arbitration award, the court will not allow such
a stay.3  The court in Bogdonoff v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Iindem. Corp."2
stated:
[I] f a statute creates a liability where otherwise none would exist ...
it will be strictly construed. A statute, even when it is remedial, must
be followed with strictness, where it gives a remedy against a party
who would not otherwise be liable. The courts will not extend or en-
large the liability by construction; they will not go beyond the clearly
expressed provisions of the act.133
An example of the pedantic approach of the New York courts is the
denial of coverage where an uninsured auto proximately caused an acci-
dent but did not physically come in contact with the injured victim.'
The statute requires physical contact between the uninsured auto and
the injured party.
New Jersey courts apply a liberal construction to the statute. The
court in Szczesny v. Vasquez '3 stated:
127. Uline v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 213 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
128. 74 N.J. Super. 138, 180 A.2d 710 (App. Div. 1962).
129. Id. at 146, 180 A.2d at 714-15.
130. See, e.g., Garcia v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 238 N.Y.S.2d 195 (App. Div.
1963); In the Matter of Steinetz, 225 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Bogdanoff v. Motor
Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 225 N.Y.S.2d 657 (N.Y. City Ct. 1962).
131. In the Matter of Steinetz, supra note 130.
132. 225 N.Y.S.2d 657 (N.Y. City Ct. 1962).
133. Id. at 658-59.
134. Bellavia v. Motor Vehicle Acc. Indem. Corp., 211 N.Y.S.2d 356 (Sup. Ct. 1961). In
the Bellavia case, the uninsured auto hit a third auto knocking it into the insured. The court
in a strict interpretation held there was no physical contact of the uninsured vehicle with
the insured. See Petition of Portman, 225 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
135. 71 N.J. Super. 347, 177 A.2d 47 (App. Div. 1962).
19641
WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
The Unsatisfied Claim and Judgment Fund statute is a measure of social
legislation. We should construe it liberally, "due regard being had to
the protection of the Fund against fraud and abuse and to the ful-
fillment of the essential legislative policy.' 13
6
Likewise, Virginia appears to favor a liberal interpretation,' but the
courts will not read into the statute a meaning which is not harmonious
with the principles of the statute. 3 '
CONCLUSION
The purpose of this note has been (1) to point out the need for
protection against the hazards of the financially irresponsible uninsured
motorist; (2) to point out the inadequacies of the compulsory insurance
and financial responsibility statutes; (3) to show the progress which
has been made in this area with the enactment of the Fund and Com-
pulsory Endorsement Plans; and (4) to point out the problems connected
with these relatively new statutes.
It has not been the purpose of this note to designate one particular
plan as the one which should be adopted by a state legislature. How-
ever, since there are advantages in both the Fund and Compulsory En-
dorsement statutes, perhaps the New York Combined Plan would be a
plausible solution. Each state legislature must determine which plan is the
most feasible and which provides the best possible protection for the
citizens of its state.
There are several areas in which the uninsured motorist statutes need
clarification. These problems have arisen with respect to (1) notice,
(2) insurer's defense of suit against the uninsured tort-feaser, (3) arbi-
tration, (4) residency requirements, (5) disclaimer of the other in-
surer, (6) statutory construction, and (7) miscellaneous problems which
may arise under the statutes. The state legislatures must attempt to
solve these problems when drafting their uninsured motorist statutes.
The legislatures should:
1. Enumerate dearly the situations in which notice must be given
to the insurer; when notice must be given to the fund director;
when notice may be excused; and what constitutes "reasonable
time" and "physical incapability."
2. Eliminate the two-fold process of trial and arbitration by pro-
viding that the entire claim shall be determined in one legal
proceeding.
136. Id. at 358, 177 A.2d at 52. See Corrigan v. Gassert, 27 N.J. 227, 142 A.2d 209
(1958).
137. See Doe v. Faulkner, 203 Va. 522, 125 SE.2d 169 (1962).
138. See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Drewery, 191 F. Supp. 852 (W.D. Va. 1961).
[Vol 15:386
Uninsured Motorist Statutes
3. Set out specific rights and duties of the insurers with respect to
the defense of the uninsured motorist.
4. Provide that the insurer's entry into the suit will not amount to
tacit admission of liability.
5. Set out the requirements of residency in specific language and
precisely identify those who will be qualified under the statute.
6. Provide some measure of relief for commuters and other non-
residents.
7. Since the statute is remedial, encourage a liberal interpretation
of the statute.
8. Explicitly state what situation will constitute disclaimer by the
the other insurer so as to deem the tort-feasor uninsured.
9. Provide for the situation of the other insurer's bankruptcy.
10. Provide some method whereby the burden of cost is placed upon
the uninsured motorist.
11. Provide adequate procedural devices to afford quick action to
an insured's claim.
12. Attempt to adopt a statute which will cover various miscellane-
ous problems which may arise and have arisen under the exist-
ing statutes.
It is hoped that this note will induce action on the part of state
legislatures to enact adequate uninsured motorist legislation. Each state
should adopt some statutory plan which will solve this complex problem.
Now is the time for each state legislature to act, as the need for protection
against the financially irresponsible uninsured motorist is greater than
ever.
GARY DUBIN
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